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Abstract 
Inter-connectedness is one important aspect in measuring the degree of systemic risk arising in the 
banking system. In this paper, this aspect besides the degree of commonality and volatility are 
measured using Principal Component Analysis (PCA), dynamic Granger causality tests and a Markov 
regime switching model. These measures can be used as leading indicators to detect pressures in the 
financial system, in particular the banking system. There is evidence that the inter-connectedness 
level together with degree of commonality and volatility among banks escalate substantially during 
the financial distress. It implies that less systemically important banks could become more important 
in the financial system during the abnormal times. Therefore, the list of systemically important banks 
as regulated in the Law on Prevention and Mitigation of Financial System Crisis (UU PPKSK) should 
be updated more frequently during the period of financial distress. 
 
JEL codes :  C32, C38, G21 
Keywords : Inter-connectedness, systemic risk, Principal Component Analysis, Granger 
causality, regime switching 
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Abstraksi 
Interkoneksi merupakan salah satu aspek penting dalam mengukur tingkat risiko sistemik yang 
muncul dalam sistem perbankan. Tulisan ini bertujuan menganalisis hal ini, termasuk tingkat 
kesamaan dan volatilitasnya yang terjadi, dengan menggunakan metode Analisis Komponen Utama, 
tes hubungan kausalitas Granger secara dinamis, dan model perubahan rezim. Ukuran-ukuran ini 
dapat menjadi indikator untuk mendeteksi tekanan pada sistem keuangan, khususnya sistem 
perbankan. Hasil analisis menunjukkan bahwa tingkat interkoneksi, tingkat kesamaan, dan volatilitas 
perbankan mengalami peningkatan yang signifikan ketika pasar keuangan dalam kondisi tertekan. 
Hal ini berarti bahwa bank-bank yang sebelumnya tidak termasuk kategori bank berdampak sistemik 
bisa menjadi memiliki dampak sistemik pada periode sistem keuangan mengalami tekanan. Oleh 
karena itu, daftar bank-bank yang berdampak sistemik sebagaimana diatur dalam UU PPKSK perlu 
untuk diperbaharui secara lebih rutin selama periode pasar keuangan dalam tekanan. 
Kode JEL :  C32, C38, G21 
Kata kunci : Interkoneksi, risiko sistemik, Analisis Komponen Utama, kausalitas Granger, 
perubahan rezim 
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1. Introduction 
 
Initiated by depreciating Baht Thailand, banking crisis coupled with currency crisis during financial 
crisis 1997 had hurt the East Asian economies harshly. Some findings reveal that damage stemming 
from this crisis accounts for 30 per cent of GDP for South Korea and Thailand and 20 per cent of GDP 
for Malaysia and Indonesia in terms of the cost of bank recapitalization (Goldstein, Kaminsky, & 
Reinhart, 2000). For Indonesia itself, not only is the cost for resolving banking crisis costly, but it also 
prolongs up to five years with total general public loss amount of 40 per cent of GDP (McLeod, 2004). 
Following this crisis, many has developed an early warning model with the purpose of predicting the 
next crisis. 
After a decade of the Asian financial crisis, the world is shocked with the collapse of a number of 
financial institutions in the US which is categorized as ‘too big to fail’ and then it spreads throughout 
the global economies becoming global financial crisis and countries affiliating to the US economy 
suffer. Indonesia experienced the same pressure during the global financial crisis 2008 – 2009, 
particularly in currency and banking system which ended up with a bail-out for Bank of Century. Both 
experiences of the Asian financial crisis 1997 – 1998 and global financial crisis 2008 – 2009 have 
underscored an important lesson of which once a financial institution fails, it can easily spread to the 
other financial institutions becoming a negative sentiment or even triggering another collapse of a 
financial institution, regardless prolonging debate of the decision of the bail-out for Bank of Century 
in Indonesia. As a consequence, it is imperative to assess systemic risks of a financial institution seeing 
its ability to spread quickly to other financial institutions within the financial system which may 
eventually damage the whole economy. 
After the global financial crisis 2008 – 2009 or known as subprime mortgage crisis, many studies have 
been performed investigating the systemic risks of a financial institution (Billio, Getmansky, Lo, & 
Pelizzon, 2010). Instances of these studies are a study by the Bank of England examining funding 
liquidity risk using a network model to evaluate probability of a bank default (Aikman et al., 2009) 
and a study of measuring systemic risk of twelve major banks in the U.S. using ex-ante probabilities of 
bank default and correlations of forecasted asset returns (Huang, Zhou, & Zhu, 2009). However, most 
of those studies focus on advanced economies, in particular the U.S. economy. An emerging economy 
like Indonesia may pose different risks as its financial institutions have different characteristics 
compared with financial institutions in the advanced countries. 
Having passed in March 2016, the Law on Prevention and Mitigation of Financial System Crisis (UU 
PPKSK) is a pivotal role for the Indonesia’s financial system focusing on banking system as banks 
dominate the Indonesia’s financial sector. One of the key features of the law is establishment of list of 
banks categorized as systemically important based on their interconnectivity, capacity and 
complexity, which is predetermined evaluated every six months (Syaifullah et al., 2016). Nevertheless, 
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this arrangement could possibly carry a risk as interconnectedness among financial institutions, in 
particular banks, are likely to escalate during financial distress implying that less systemically 
important banks could become more important in the financial system during the abnormal times.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes literature reviews on measuring 
systemic risks of financial institutions, while Section 3 explains both the methodology and the data 
used. Section 4 then discusses the findings and results and finally Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
A number of studies has been conducted to describe and measure systemic risk of the financial 
institutions. One important concept of systemic risk is that a systemic event may affect a number of 
financial institutions transmitting failures from one institution to another, so that a measure of 
systemic risk should be able to identify the risk of systemic institutions, which are so large and 
interconnected exposing negative spillover effects on others (Brunnermeier & Oehmke, 2013; 
Hartmann, Straetmans, & Vries, 2005). It is also imperative to map out relationships or inter-linkages 
among financial institutions in order to be able to identify systemic risk as well as financial fragility 
(Allen & Gale, 2007). Thus, to measure the systemic risk on the Indonesia’s financial institutions, this 
paper focuses from those points of view. Since the Indonesia’s financial institutions are dominated by 
banks, in terms of assets, this paper concentrates to measure systemic risk on Indonesian banks. 
Theoretical framework lying beneath analyses in this paper refers to relationships among the 
Indonesian banks which may spread either through fundamental shocks or negative externalities, as 
well as network effects or escalating volatility (Allen & Gale, 2007; Anandarajan, Lee, & Anandarajan, 
2001; Brunnermeier, 2008; Daníelsson & Peñaranda, 2011; Diamond & Rajan, 2009; Shin, 2012). Such 
relationship or interconnectivity is one of the important features of systemic risks described in the 
Law on Prevention and Mitigation of Financial System Crisis (UU PPKSK). 
Billio et al. (2010) divides empirical literatures of systemic risks into three groups. The first group 
deliberates studies on bank contagion, while the second gives attention to crises of banks, booms of 
lending and aggregate fluctuations. The last group focuses on spillover effects, contagion of financial 
institutions and joint crashes in financial markets. In studying the bank contagion, the first group 
bases on the autocorrelation of the number of bank returns and bank defaults as well as bank 
exposures among others meaning that a bank default may make other banks insolvent (de Bandt & 
Hartmann, 2000). Other studies categorized in this group use correlations of bank asset portfolios and 
default probabilities (Lehar, 2005), besides bank trading risk similarities (Wong, 2008) and bank 
failures with maximum likelihood estimation of cumulative negative abnormal returns (Bartram, 
Brown, & Hund, 2007) as measures of systemic risks. 
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The second group of the studies concentrates on ratios of bank capital and its liabilities such that 
macro fundamentals can have noteworthy predictive power in order to detect systemic risks in the 
banking sector (Gonzalez-Hermosillo, Pazarbasioglu, & Billings, 1997; Hardy & Pazarbaşioğlu, 1999). 
Other studies in this group use indexes of credit derivatives prices (Bhansali, Gingrich, & Longstaff, 
2008) and inter-linkages between macroeconomic conditions and financial markets together with 
their intermediaries (De Nicolo & Lucchetta, 2009) as measures of systemic risks among the financial 
institutions. 
The third group of the studies brings together spillover effects, contagion of financial institutions and 
joint crashes in financial markets as measures of systemic risks. This group uses such as correlations 
resulted from Granger causality tests between exchange rates and interest rates before and after the 
Asian crisis (Kaminsky, Lizondo, & Reinhart, 1998) and simple correlations to measure volatility 
changes during the Asian crisis (Forbes & Rigobon, 2001). They find similar results finding that there 
were many causal correlations detected during the crisis. 
In order to measure the systemic risks, this paper follows Billio et al. (2010) who measure the degree 
of connectivity among the U.S. financial institutions. Due to the complexity of the financial system in 
the U.S., they define the system incorporating banks, brokers, hedge funds and insurance companies. 
Rather than following them in dividing into four types of financial institutions, this paper stresses on 
just banks since the Indonesia’s financial sector is dominated by banks in terms of assets. Adopting 
Billio et al. (2010) methods, this paper uses principal component analyses, regime switching models 
and dynamic granger causality tests as measures of systemic risk on the Indonesia’s banking system. 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
3.1. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
Principal component analysis (PCA) can detect empirically increased commonality among the asset 
returns, for instance banking asset returns. This method models variance structure of a set of 
variables using linear combinations of the variables by decomposing the covariance matrices, so that 
it can measure the degree of commonality among the variables (Barber & Copper, 2012; Billio, 
Caporin, Pelizzon, & Sartore, 2012). For instance, asset returns are driven by a linear K-factor model, 
the first K principal components explain most of the time-series variation in returns. 
 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛿1𝐹1𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝛿𝑘𝐹𝑘𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡    (1) 
 
Where 𝐸[𝜀𝑗𝑡𝜀𝑗′𝑡] = 0 for any 𝑗 ≠ 𝑗
′, so the covariance matrix ∑  of the vector of returns  
𝑅𝑡 ≡ [𝑅1𝑡 … 𝑅𝑗𝑡]
′ can be expressed as 
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𝑉𝑎𝑟[𝑅𝑡] ≡  ∑  of = 𝑄𝜃𝑄
′, 𝜃 =
[
 
 
 
 
𝜗1 0 . . 0
0 𝜗2 𝑒 𝑒 0
. 𝑒 . 𝑒 .
. 𝑒 𝑒 . .
0 . . 0 𝜗𝑁]
 
 
 
 
  (2) 
 
Where 𝜃 contains eigenvalues of ∑ falong its diagonal and 𝑄 is the matrix of subsequent eigenvectors. 
The unit length linear combination of the original variables with maximum variance is expressed by 
the first principal component, while subsequent principal components maximize variance among unit 
length linear combinations which are orthogonal to the former components (Johnson & Wichern, 
2002). 
 
3.2. Markov Regime Switching Model 
 
Following Billio et al. (2010), the next measure of systemic risk can be captured through sudden 
regime-changes in the volatilities of the expected returns of financial institutions, which is in this case 
they are banks. This regime-switching model is proposed because in general the linear models are not 
able to capture regime shifts or discrete changes which commonly happens during financial distresses. 
Examples of regime shifts are Mexican crisis 1994-1995, Asian crisis 1997-1998 and global financial 
crisis 2008-2009 (Billio et al., 2010). 
 
The regime switching model proposed in this paper is a simple two-state model for the banks in order 
to get a measure of systemic risk. Such two-state model is empirically able to gauge the possibility of 
a regime switching from a normal to a distressed financial regime (Bekaert & Harvey, 1995; Duong & 
Swanson, 2011; Guidolin, 2011a, 2011b). The composite index return is characterized by volatility in 
each of the two states of the Markov chain 𝑍𝑖,𝑡, which is estimated for both low and high volatility 
states. This paper follows the convention that 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 0  is defined as the low-volatility regime and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 =
1 is defined as the high-volatility regime. The regime switching process can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖(𝑍𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜎𝑖(𝑍𝑖,𝑡)𝑢𝑖,𝑡    (3) 
 
In which 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the returns of index 𝑖 in period 𝑡, 𝜎𝑖  is the volatility of index 𝑖, 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 is independently and 
identically distributed over time, and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is the two state Markov chain with transition probability 
matrix 𝑃𝑧,𝑖 for index 𝑖. The first order Markov assumption requires that the probability of being in a 
regime depends on the previous state, so that 
 
𝑃(𝑆𝑡 = 𝑗𝑆𝑡−1 = 𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑡)    (4) 
 
Or in a transition matrix equation (4) can be written as: 
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𝑝(𝑡) =  [
𝑝11(𝑡) … 𝑝1𝑀(𝑡)
. … .
𝑝𝑀1(𝑡) … 𝑝𝑀𝑀(𝑡)
]    (5) 
 
Where the 𝑖𝑗 –th element reflects the probability of transitioning from regime 𝑖 in period 𝑡 − 1 to 
regime 𝑗 in period 𝑡. An alternative measure of systemic risk is constructed by taking average of 
probabilities of being in the high-volatility states of different groups of banks, including banks book 
four, banks book three as well as banks book two, so that: 
 
𝑆𝑝,𝑡 =
1
𝑚
∑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑍𝑖,𝑡
𝑚
𝑖=1 = 1𝑅𝑖,𝑡)     (6) 
 
Where 𝑆𝑝,𝑡 is simply average of all probabilities of high volatility regime among all banks. Evidence of 
interdependence between banks is present when there is a noteworthy increase in the average 
probability 𝑆𝑝,𝑡. 
 
3.3. Dynamic Granger Causality 
 
The third measure of systemic risk used in this paper is Granger causality which is performed 
dynamically rolling-over 36 months. Not only is the degree of interconnectedness important, but also 
the direction of the relationship is also essential. Classical Granger causality can help predict such 
direction (Billio et al., 2010). The linear inter-relationships can be represented with the following 
model: 
 
𝑋𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑗𝑋𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 + 𝜖𝑡   (7) 
 
𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑋𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑑𝑗𝑌𝑡−𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 + 𝜇𝑡    (8) 
 
Where 𝑎𝑗 , 𝑏𝑗 , 𝑐𝑗, 𝑑𝑗 are the estimated coefficients, 𝑚 is the maximum lag considered, while 𝜖𝑡 and 𝜇𝑡 are 
two uncorrelated errors following white noise processes. 
 
Causality denotes that 𝑌 causes 𝑋 when 𝑏𝑗  is significantly different from zero and 𝑋 causes 𝑌 when 𝑐𝑗 
is significantly different from zero. If both hypotheses are true, it implies that there is a two-way or 
feedback relationship between the series. The number of maximum lags selection is based on Bayesian 
Information Criterion. The results of the causality tests are based on F-test with null hypotheses that 
𝑏𝑗  or 𝑐𝑗 are equal to zero. 
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3.4. Data 
 
The data used for the estimation is a monthly data for banking stock indices incorporating 32 banks 
with sample period of February 1992 – March 2016. All data is obtained from the Bloomberg. Banks 
returns are then constructed as monthly percentage changes. Composite index of all banks returns are 
formed weighted based on their market capitalizations in the stock market. 
Subsamples are also created to test performances of different groups of banks within varied 
subsample periods. The groups of banks are categorized based on their size of core capital. According 
to the Regulation of the Financial Services Authority No. 6/POJK.03/2016, banks are categorized into 
four groups, i.e. banks book 1 with core capital less than 1 trillion rupiahs, banks book 2 with core 
capital greater than 1 trillion but less than 5 trillion rupiahs, banks book 3 with core capital greater 
than 5 trillion but less than 30 trillion rupiahs, and banks book 4 with core capital at least 30 trillion 
rupiahs. However, data for banks book 1 is unavailable on Bloomberg, so that this paper only covers 
banks book 2 to 4. 
Unit roots tests of the raw data and constructed variables are performed using Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Perron tests in Eviews version 8. The results show that all raw data are 
integrated processes of order one (I (1)) at 1 per cent significance level. After constructions, all are I 
(0) or stationary. 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
This section discusses estimated measures of systemic risks as described in Section 3 using historical 
data of monthly return of banking stock indexes, consisting of four different measures. Subsection 4.1 
reports estimated results of PCA in a number of different subsamples with various periods, while 
Subsection 4.2 reports the results of estimates using Markov Regime Switching Model. Subsection 4.3 
and 4.4 subsequently discuss results of dynamic granger causality tests in graph and network diagram. 
 
4.1. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 
As the central point of a systemic risk is commonality among a number of financial institutions, this 
first measure captures the commonality through the PCA analysis which is able to extract the main 
components driving variations among the institutions. As banks dominate the Indonesia’s financial 
sector in terms of assets, this paper focuses on the banking sector. Table 1 presents the first principal 
components in different subsamples and different time periods to capture behavior of different 
groups of banks in different periods of time. 
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To test behavior of different groups of banks and also due to data availability, the sample is divided 
into 5 subsamples, including group of six banks which has longer available data since 1994, group of 
15 banks with data since 2004, and finally 3 groups of banks classified based on their assets. Banks 
with assets more than 30 trillion rupiahs are grouped in Book 4 (sample of 10 banks), while banks 
with assets between 5 and 30 trillion rupiahs are grouped in Book 3 (sample of 6 banks), and banks 
with assets between 1 and 5 trillion rupiahs are put in Book 2 (sample of 6 banks). 
 
The sample period for estimation is divided into 8 groups based on periods of financial crises or period 
of financial distress. According to literatures, Indonesia has experienced several periods of financial 
distress, such as during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 and during global financial crisis of 
2008-2009. Ending quantitative easing program by the US in 2013 as well as Chinese yuan devaluation 
and uncertainty of the Fed’s plan to hike interest rate in 2015 are also some instances of events which 
has already put Indonesia’s financial sector under pressure. Therefore, the sample period in these 
estimates are grouped into several different times. 
 
Table 1 Principal component analysis (1st principal component) of the monthly return of banking 
stock indexes 
Sample Description 
1994-
1996 
1997-
1999 
2000-
2002 
2004-
2006 
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2013-
2015 
2013-
2016 
6 banks PC 1 2.37 4.84 2.29 2.60 2.44 2.18 2.19 1.74 
 
Proportion 0.39 0.81 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.36 0.37 0.29 
15 banks PC 1 - - - 6.47 5.67 5.60 5.89 5.39 
  Proportion - - - 0.43 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.36 
BUKU 4 
(4 banks) PC 1 - - - 4.44 5.42 3.70 4.72 4.37 
 
Proportion - - - 0.44 0.54 0.37 0.47 0.44 
BUKU 3 
(12 banks) PC 1 - - - 1.84 2.86 2.47 1.72 1.67 
  Proportion - - - 0.31 0.48 0.41 0.29 0.28 
BUKU 2 
(6 banks) PC 1 - - - - - - 2.95 2.44 
  Proportion - - - - - - 0.49 0.41 
Source: Author's calculation 
        
 
The results in Table 1 show that during the periods of financial distress, degree of commonality as 
reflected in the eigenvalues of the first principal component as well as their proportions  scales up, for 
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example in 1997-1999. Proportion of 0.81 in 1997-1999 was much higher compared with the 
proportion during 1994-1996 and 2000-2002, the periods before and after the Asian financial crisis.  
 
However, a slight different results come up for sample period of 2007-2009. Not all groups of banks 
experienced increase of the degree of commonality during the period. Estimates with group sample of 
6 banks and 15 banks show that those banks even experienced lower degree of commonality as 
reflected by lower eigenvalues of the first principal component, but estimates with group sample of 
banks book 4 and banks book 3 show the other way around with evidence of significant increase of 
the degree of commonality among the banks. It may indicate that the banks are segmented or in other 
words, a book-4-bank is likely willing to lend to or borrow from other banks book 4 only and a book-
3-bank prefers doing business with other alike banks with the same type only, especially during the 
financial distress. 
 
Estimates with sample period of 2013-2015 also reveals an interesting feature with evidence of no 
increase in degree of commonality in banks book 3 during the period. It may reveal the fact that more 
open a financial institution in capital market, more sensitive they are to external shocks. Aside from 
the external shocks, the higher commonality implying growing pressures on groups of 6 banks, 15 
banks and banks book 4 may also be influenced by domestic shocks, such as interest rate cap 
announced by the Financial Services Authority. The intervention from the regulator seems seriously 
hit banks book 4. In addition, the estimates using more recent sample period (2013-March 2016) 
signal that pressures on banking sector have cooled down. 
 
4.2. Markov Regime Switching Model 
 
The second systemic risk measure is the estimate of the Markov regime switching model presented in 
Figure 1. The composite index return is characterized by volatility in each of the two states of the 
Markov chain  𝑍𝑖,𝑡 , which is estimated for both low and high volatility states. This paper follows the 
convention that  𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 0  is defined as the low-volatility regime and  𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 1  is defined as the high-
volatility regime.  
 
The graph in Figure 1 shows the probability of being in the high-volatility state (Z=1) for the whole 
sample for the banking composite index return. Banks had been in a high-volatility state from the 
fourth quarter of 1993 to the first quarter of 1994 and subsiding thereafter until mid-1997. This later 
period is called period of the “calm before the storm” (Billio et al., 2010). During the Asian financial 
crisis since 1997 Indonesia’s banks had been in the high-volatility state and descending by the end of 
2003. It shows how severe Indonesia’s banking system hit by the crisis and it takes a long time to 
recover. There were also sparks of growing probability of being in the high-volatility regime at the 
end of 2004 at which Indonesia had a problem on its mutual funds, but the probability was quite 
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relatively low compared with during the financial crisis period. Another spark surfaced during and 
after ‘mini crisis’ in 2005-2006, but again the level was quite low. 
 
The next dramatic increase of probability of being in a high-volatility regime was during the global 
financial crisis in 2008-2009 with the peak of just under 0.9 (90 per cent) on April 2009. Not 
surprisingly, the high-volatility states of banking index are also associated with crisis periods.  
 
In 2013 when the Fed announced that they would end their quantitative easing program, a spike 
appeared. So was at the end of 2015 before the Fed started to tighten its monetary policy by rising its 
benchmark interest rate for the first time since the global financial crisis. However, the level of 
probability of being in high-volatility state was far below the probability level during either Asian 
financial crisis 1997-1998 or the global financial crisis 2008-2009. 
 
Figure 1 Probability of being in the high volatility regime for the monthly return of banking stock 
indexes, February 1992 – March 2016 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
 
An alternative measure of systemic risk is constructed by taking average of probabilities of being in 
the high-volatility states of different groups of banks, including banks BUKU 4, banks BUKU 3 as well 
as banks BUKU 2. However, due to data availability, this alternative measure only covers banks BUKU 
4 and BUKU 3 with subsample January 2007 – March 2016. In addition, the probability of each banks 
BUKU 4 and BUKU 3 being in the high volatility regime for the monthly return of banking stock indexes 
are also plotted to look at their contributions. As expected, banks BUKU 4 have greater contributions 
to the overall probability of being in the high volatility regime during financial distress (see Figure 2 
and 3).  
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Figure 2 Average probability of being in the high volatility regime for the monthly return of banking 
stock indexes of banks BUKU 4 and BUKU 3, January 2007 – March 2016 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
 
Figure 3 Contribution of banks BUKU 4 (blue area) and BUKU 3 (orange area) to the probability of 
being in the high volatility regime for the monthly return of banking stock indexes, January 2007 – 
March 2016 (stacked area chart) 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
 
 
 
 
0.000
0.100
0.200
0.300
0.400
0.500
0.600
Ja
n
-0
7
Ju
n
-0
7
N
o
v-
0
7
A
p
r-
0
8
Se
p
-0
8
Fe
b
-0
9
Ju
l-
0
9
D
ec
-0
9
M
ay
-1
0
O
ct
-1
0
M
ar
-1
1
A
u
g-
1
1
Ja
n
-1
2
Ju
n
-1
2
N
o
v-
1
2
A
p
r-
1
3
Se
p
-1
3
Fe
b
-1
4
Ju
l-
1
4
D
ec
-1
4
M
ay
-1
5
O
ct
-1
5
M
ar
-1
6
0.000
0.200
0.400
0.600
0.800
1.000
1.200
Ja
n
-0
7
Ju
n
-0
7
N
o
v-
0
7
A
p
r-
0
8
Se
p
-0
8
Fe
b
-0
9
Ju
l-
0
9
D
ec
-0
9
M
ay
-1
0
O
ct
-1
0
M
ar
-1
1
A
u
g-
1
1
Ja
n
-1
2
Ju
n
-1
2
N
o
v-
1
2
A
p
r-
1
3
Se
p
-1
3
Fe
b
-1
4
Ju
l-
1
4
D
ec
-1
4
M
ay
-1
5
O
ct
-1
5
M
ar
-1
6
13 
 
4.3. Dynamic Granger Causality 
 
The third measure of banking systemic risk is resulted from linear Granger causality test which is 
dynamically performed among 36-monthly returns of banks with sample period from January 1997 
to March 2016. Based on causal interconnectedness, this systemic risk measure may capture both 
contagion effects between banks as well as exposures among them to a common factor, such as the 
Indonesian equity market. 
 
Upward trends in Figure 2 present increasing interconnectedness among banks and propagating 
shocks from one bank to another. The interconnectedness peaked during Asian financial crisis 1997-
1998, 2001-2002 and during global financial crisis 2008-2009. There were also evidences of soaring 
interconnectedness during the US taper tantrum in 2013 and during the financial distress in 2015, i.e. 
when the Fed was going to raise its benchmark interest rate for the first time after seven years of low-
nearly zero interest rate. There was also an intensifying interconnectedness among the banks during 
‘mini crisis’ 2005-2006. These findings are consistent with the previous findings using two different 
measures in Section 4.1 and 4.2. 
 
Figure 4 Dynamic linear granger causality relationships (at 10% level of statistical significance) among 
the 36-monthly-return of banking stock indexes, January 1997 – March 2016 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
 
Analyzing more deeply by looking at the level of individual banks, the results imply the same 
conclusions. During the financial distress, the interconnectedness among banks rises dramatically 
(see Figure 5 and 6). This dynamic Granger causality tests can also actually be used to rank banks 
which are categorized as systemically important banks. Banks with more connections can be 
considered as more systemically important banks from the interconnectedness point of view. Another 
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important finding from Figure 5 and 6 is that banks which might not be systemically important during 
normal times, may pose higher degree of systemic risk during period of financial distress.  
15 
 
 
Figure 5 Pairwise Granger causality tests, significant at 10 per cent level, sample: May 2007 – April 2010 
Source: Author's calculation 
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Figure 6 Pairwise Granger causality tests, significant at 10 per cent level, sample: January 2004 – December 2006 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
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5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
 
Inter-connectedness is one important aspect in measuring the degree of systemic risk arising in the 
banking system. It can be used as a leading indicator to detect growing pressures in the financial system, 
in particular the banking system. There is evidence that the inter-connectedness level together with 
degree of commonality and volatility among banks escalate substantially during the financial distress. It 
implies that less systemically important banks could become more important in the financial system 
during the abnormal times. Therefore, the evaluation period of six months in setting up list of systemically 
important banks as regulated in the UU PPKSK could possibly carry a risk during the period of financial 
distress. During the abnormal times, the list should be updated more frequently, for instance in a monthly 
basis. 
 
In addition, there are still some drawbacks in this paper. One drawback is the linearity assumption used 
in estimating the dynamic Granger causality tests as well as in estimating the Markov regime switching 
model. The relationships among banks may not be linear. Therefore, estimating nonlinear Granger 
causality tests and also nonlinear regime switching model can be a worth extension of this paper in the 
future. Autoregressive lags may also be possible to be incorporated in the regime switching model. 
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